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Never stop being proven.

A full audit and retest every week, run by an agent that already knows your business — plus daily checks in between and a direct line to us for blue team support. We test only what you authorise.

01A custom agent onboarded to your stack and auth flows once, then reused every run.
02Full audit + retest on your release cadence, with lighter checks daily in between.
03Agent memory carries over — each run builds on the last instead of starting cold.
04Blue team support and a named engineer — checked by a person before anything reaches you.
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Server access lets us mirror your stack exactly, so nothing surprises the run.
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From real runs

What Sintropyc has already found.

A sample from real runs — on live products and authorised labs, target names withheld. Every item below was confirmed with a working exploit, not a scanner guess.

16
vulnerabilities confirmed with a working exploit
0
false alarms — unproven issues never reach the report
Confirmed, by class
IDOR / BOLA · 5 Unauthenticated PII / data · 3 Secrets & misconfig · 5 Injection → RCE · 3
Unauthenticated PII exposure Confirmed

Any numeric user ID returned full profile data — date of birth, city, country, gender — with no login at all. It chained to a second open endpoint that dumped a whole membership list, making the entire user base enumerable.

Broken object-level auth (IDOR / BOLA) Confirmed

Changing a single object ID in a request let one account read another account's private records — the flaw scanners miss because the response looks perfectly valid.

Security misconfiguration → WAF / origin bypass Confirmed

The real origin server was reachable directly behind the CDN/WAF — so rate-limits and bot rules could be walked around — alongside a weak content-security-policy and missing security headers.

Injection → remote code execution Confirmed · Critical

A template-injection and a framework left in debug mode each opened a remote-code-execution path (Jinja2 SSTI and the Ignition / CVE-2021-3129 class) — full server reach from a single request.

Findings are anonymised and paraphrased. Every one was reproduced with a working exploit and human-reviewed before disclosure to the target.